Efficient but Unethical: Germany’s RFA Acquired Engine Technology Through a Controversial Deal

German company RFA (Rocket Factory Augsburg) allegedly acquired all the necessary technologies from Ukraine to independently produce the engine for its RFA ONE rocket. However, it looks like the Ukrainian government never approved the transfer of such technologies. The company reportedly took advantage of the ongoing war to obscure its actions. Despite having all the schematics and components, RFA has been unable to successfully launch its rocket using the Ukrainian engines.

Genious team or help from outside: what’s behind the cosmic speed of RFA’s development

Founded in 2018, RFA set out to create small payload rockets with a proposed launch price of around €3 million, significantly undercutting competitors. These competitive promises allowed the company to attract investments and kickstart its R&D efforts.

By 2020, RFA announced that it had developed its own rocket engine, showcasing photos of it on a test stand. Achieving such a milestone — developing the rocket’s most crucial and complex component —typically takes years for most companies. RFA’s achievement in under two years raised eyebrows.

“Implementation of such projects takes years, sometimes decades”, confirms a Ukrainian engineer who asked to stay anonymous.

The reason behind this rapid development appears straightforward: instead of conducting a full R&D process, the company allegedly adopted a pre-existing solution and presented it as its own innovation.

RFA and KB “Pivdenne”: A Rocket Engine Deal Cloaked in Suspicion

RFA (Rocket Factory Augsburg) began by developing a liquid rocket engine utilizing an oxidizer-rich staged combustion (ORSC) cycle with RP-1 and LOX as propellants. Such engines had not been used in European Space Agency (ESA) projects before, as European rockets traditionally relied on LH2+LOX or MMH with N2O4, and avoided oxidizer-rich combustion technologies. However, engines with ORSC cycles and RP-1+LOX fuel have a proven track record, having been successfully developed and used by Soviet engineers, whose expertise and technologies remain in Ukraine at KB “Pivdenne” (Pivdenne Design Bureau – ed) and the Pivdenmash manufacturing plant.

In 2018, shortly after its founding, RFA signed a contract with Ukraine’s state-owned Pivdenne for components such as valves, turbopumps, gas generators, and ignition units. The contract, worth $300,000, involved a relatively small number of parts. Yet, this was reportedly enough for RFA to master the entire production process and eliminate dependence on Ukrainian supplies. To date, the company has manufactured at least ten engines and continues production, without renewing contracts for additional Ukrainian components.

While this could suggest reverse engineering — a controversial approach from both the business ethics and legal perspectives — what truly transpired appears to be outright corruption and theft of intellectual property.

According to RFA’s official statements, the startup, without prior experience in liquid rocket engine development, managed to conduct R&D for one of the most complex engine designs in just three years. Moreover, they claim to have not only replicated the engine but also significantly modernized it—all without Ukrainian specialists or access to dual-use technologies. This narrative stretches credibility and raises serious ethical and legal concerns.

Experts we spoke with have noted that technical documentation, while valuable, is far from sufficient for developing complex engines like the RD809K.

“Many critical technological nuances are at the fingertips of specialists with years of experience,” an industry expert explained anonymously. “For this purpose, engaging Ukrainian specialists with expertise who will constantly work on the following issues is critical.”

When asked if RFA’s approach of acquiring documentation and some components to create a modified engine without involving the specialists who developed the RD-8 was reasonable, the expert said no.

“From my experience, the majority of similar deals end in nothing, with a lot of wasted time and money. A working but more costly and extended model is when the agreement includes, in addition to documentation, samples of finished products and technologies and constant support from the seller’s specialists. And sometimes an additional service of training your specialists. Because even reverse engineering (whether stolen or purchased) is too long and expensive.”

Exploiting Loopholes and Corruption

The Ukrainian government authorized KB “Pivdenne” to export only ready-made components of the RD809K engine — a heavily modified version of the RD8, which was used in the iconic SS-18 Satan missile. In the same year, Ukraine streamlined procedures for the import and export of dual-use goods, granting companies autonomy in handling the necessary documentation. RFA reportedly leveraged this situation to acquire not only engine components but also the technical documentation for the RD809K project. This documentation had been developed by KB “Pivdenne” and sold to Saudi Arabia five years earlier for $70 million.

The idea of selling a $70 million product for just $300,000 is implausible. Yet, RFA seemingly managed to secure what it sought, while KB “Pivdenne” found itself embroiled in a corruption scandal widely covered by Ukrainian media.

RFA and the RD809K Controversy: Borrowed Technologies and Ethical Questions

The onset of the war in Ukraine abruptly halted any investigation into the dealings between KB “Pivdenne” and RFA. Politically, such an inquiry would have been disadvantageous for Ukraine, considering its dependence on military aid from Germany, where RFA is based. Moreover, RFA enjoys strong support from ESA, with figures such as Jean-Jacques Dordain, a former ESA director, serving on its board. These circumstances made it politically expedient for Ukraine to overlook the potential theft of its technology, despite the loss of future contracts and integration opportunities within the European space economy.

To implement and modernize the RD809K engine, RFA would have required not only technical documentation but also the expertise of Ukrainian specialists. Following the development and adjustment of the engines, RFA hired key personnel from Ukraine. Among them was Maria Terekhova, previously Deputy Head of Division at KB “Pivdenne,” who joined RFA as Business Development Manager by 2022. It is clear that senior-level experts like Terekhova were critical for ensuring the engine’s functionality and providing a facade of legitimacy to the project.

Another expert we spoke with is Oleksandr Levenko, who has a long career in the rocket and space sectors. He notes that in rocketry, experience is the key when it comes to such projects.

“Why did the US Moon programme use the practical experience of German engineers in the form of the Saturn booster rather than the grandiose technical project Sea Dragon by American engineers, which was ahead of its time? Because they trust experience, even if it is outdated,” he expains.

According to Levenko, obtaining a technology such as RD809K engine is not enough.

“Even if you use ready-made units and your design (and this is mandatory), you need ‘ancient’ consultants who will explain the unreliability of modern tendencies to launch a rocket without working out its reliability, help to write technical specifications for each unit and missile (the requirements of the technical specifications are confirmed at all stages of development of the rocket and the incoming units before the delivery to serial production by calculations and tests), explain what is a comprehensive programme of experimental testing – it is needed to confirm the calculated reliability,” Levenko says.

Another possibility, as outlined by Oleksandr Levenko, involves purchasing all the necessary components for the rocket, propulsion system, or combustion chamber with nozzle. However, these elements are not standalone; they are interconnected and must align with a unified project based on calculations and design, even if a pre-existing unit is used as a foundation.

In this scenario, the company would aim to develop its own comparable pieces and establish in-house manufacturing capabilities. This process would go beyond acquiring drawings and finished product samples—it would also require obtaining detailed written production notes and commissioning the production of technological equipment, which would subsequently need modernization to meet project-specific requirements.

“From my experience, not everything is written in the written technological process!”, Levenko said. “Inviting designers, constructors, technologists, production organisers, testers, and even developers of technological tooling is necessary. For example, you need tooling to assemble a rocket to ensure the alignment of all the incoming tanks, engines, etc. This requires special tooling, which, for example, Firefly Aerospace encountered and consulted Yuzhmash Plant.”

Oleksandr Levenko concludes that developing an in-house engine using modern materials and technologies is both more efficient and cost-effective. To achieve this, the project should be led by experienced Ukrainian specialists. While it is possible to outsource the project’s technical requirements (TOR) and preliminary design to “Pivdenne”, the financial constraints of most startups make this an impractical option: “No startup will have enough money for this. The only exception may be startups financed by the USA through Darpa in the interests of the Pentagon”.

Final words

This saga underscores the complexities of international collaboration in the aerospace sector, where blurred lines between innovation, exploitation, and geopolitics often come into play.

RFA’s acquisition of advanced rocket engine technologies for just $300,000 raises serious questions about the nature of its dealings with KB “Pivdenne.” Given the tight collaboration between the two entities, the rapid R&D timeline, and the improbably low price paid for such critical technology, suspicions of a corrupt agreement are hard to ignore.

Yet, under current circumstances, neither ESA’s regulatory bodies nor Ukrainian authorities appear motivated to investigate. The geopolitical stakes—Germany’s role in supporting Ukraine militarily and RFA’s strategic alignment with ESA—make such inquiries politically inconvenient for both sides.

We reached the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), the US departments of State and Defense regarding dual-use technologies, the Ukrainian Space Agency and export control offices – but never got replies.

Despite the failure of initial launch attempt, RFA remains committed to refining and using its engine, which is firmly rooted in Ukrainian expertise and design. The story highlights the blurred lines between innovation, collaboration, and exploitation in the aerospace industry, particularly in times of geopolitical and economic turmoil.